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Abstract. The Deviants' Dilemma is a two-person game with the individual gain conflicting with the choice
for global good. Evolutionary considerations yield fixed point attractors, with the pehenomena of exclusion
potentially  playing  an  important  role  when  current  opponent  information  is  available.  We  carry  out
computer  simulations  which  substantiates  and  illuminates  theoretical  claims,  and  brings  to  light  the
pertinance of the choice between deterministic and stochastic dynamics, and the conjecture of 'ergodicity
spread'.
Introduction
In  social  and  economic  systems,  agents  interact  with  each  other  through  games  or
localized potentials, in the sense that different agents are subjected to different pertaining
potentials, which are dependent on the states (or moves) of the other agents, thus allowing
the dislocation of individual optima from the global optimum. Interesting cases are when
the agents' respective optimum states (“Nash state”) do not constitute the community's
optimum (“Pareto state”), as given by the Prisoner's Dilemma and its multiplayer version
the Public Goods Game. This has become the paradigm for studying the evolution of
Paretoic cooperativity from selfish Nash tendencies [Axelrod, 1984].
Recently, the Deviants' Dilemma, which falls into the same category of games, has been
proposed [Azhar  et  al.,  2003]  to model  the run-up to  seniority in  institutions  [Frank,
1989]. A theoretical evolutionary analysis of the game was carried out; it remains for this
paper to provide computer simulation studies to test the theoretical predictions and to
further elucidate the fine ramifications  that  may lie  hidden in  pure conceptualization.
Furthermore, when information on current opponent states are available (albeit at a cost),
there is the potential that a Nash state may loose out by being excluded as Pareto pairs are
formed. 
We describe briefly the Deviants' Dilemma in the next section, and the simulation studies
and results in those following it.
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Deviants' Dilemma
The Deviants’ Dilemma (DD) game is a two-person interaction game with the following
symmetric ‘fixed zero baseline’ 22 payoff matrix: 
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0
                             c
c
with  the  requirement  that bca 0 .  The  evolutionary stable  state  (ESS)  analysis
yields that the fraction of pseudos,  p,  tends to 1.0 for all  initial  states, given rational
choice. If the agents are allowed to check on the state of their prospective partners with
the cost r, then p has a fixed point of 1-(r/c).
Simulation
We carried out  computer  simulations of a  population of 1000 agents playing the DD
game with random partners, at least for 50 timesteps (plays per agent). We chose  a=2,
b=6 and c=4 for the payoffs. We utilized for comparison two different updating schemes
–  deterministic  (i.e.  rational  agents),  where  moves  are  played  depending  on  direct
comparison  for  better  score  between  between  a  pseudo  and  being  a  deviant,  and
probabilistic, where moves are chosen randomly depending on the ratio of the scores. We
also tried two methods for choice of play: one where the moves are based on the average
of every agents immediate previous scores for the two states, and one where the moves
are based on the average scores from only the individual agents' own histories (but of all
previous scores).
When  checking  on  partners  is  chosen,  agents  check  prospective  partners  until
advantageous ones are found or until none of such are found when they are forced to play
with whosoever they found last.  A cost  of 1 to the payoff is incurred when an agent
checks.
Results and Discussions
The  results  for  deterministic  updates,  without  partner-checking,  with  different  initial
pseudo fractions, are given in Figure 1 for moves based on everyone's previous scores,
and in Figure 2 for moves based on own histories. Figure 1 supports ESS analysis, while
more 'myopic' agents pose some problems in Figure 2. In fact, the latter is worse if we
start the agents with zero memory, and any initial move can freeze state choices to the
limited initial  set,  and thus seriously breaking ergodicity, especially with probabilistic
updating. (In our simulations we have put some arbitrary initial scores for both states in
the agents' histories.) A kind of 'ergodicity spread' conjecture, where the representative
statistical  ensemble  is  reflected  both  horizontally  in  the  agent  population  score
distribution and vertically in the individual agent history, seems unjustified. 
FIGURE 1
FIGURE 2
Figures  3  and  4  show  the  evolution  with  probabilitic  updating  for  moves  based  on
everyone's previous score and one's own history respectively. Here a behaviour different
from that with rational choice is seen. For both cases, there appears to be an attractor
around p ~ 0.7. In the second case, for initially many pseudos, there is an initial dip in
pseudos before the ratio  levels  up at  the attractor.  Probabilistic  updating incorporates
some kind of noise, which allows more 'exploration' of the phase space, and thus better
ergodicity, as compared to deterministic updating. The seeming appearance of the fixed
point is not understood as yet and requires further scrutiny.
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FIGURE 3
FIGURE 4
Partner checking seems not to change signifcantly the results obtained, except for the case
of probabilistic moves based on the average of everyone's previous score. This is shown
in Figure 5. Now 'pseudomania' dominates fully, and there is no sign of the expected
fixed point at p = 0.75 (except for the case of probabilistic moves based on own history,
but then we need to explain how the fixed point is there even without partner checking,
where pseudos are expected to dominate fully). The expected effect of exclusion is not
obvious, possibly because the time to system stability is too small for agents to have time
learn to make Pareto partners. 
Dynamics of computer simulations may bring about subtle differences to the theoretical
ESS analysis where some hidden assumptions may have been made. This could lead to
the differences in the expected and obtained results. For instance, when an agent choses
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to check on his partner, theoretical analysis assumes that the agent knows what gain he
would have by doing so. In the simulations, this has got to be represented in the scores
available upon which the agent makes his choice, and it is not obvious that the scores,
whether form everyone's previous experience, or from own histories, should contain this
information (intrinsic in the scores), or at least could contain this information (i.e. enough
ergodicity).
FIGURE 5
Conclusions
In the  simulation  studies  of  the  Deviants'  Dilemma,  we show agreement  of  the  ESS
analysis for pseudo dominance for agents with rational choice and looking at other agents'
performances.  However,  questions  are  raised  from the  different  behaviour  of  systems
with probabilistic moves and with myopic agents, while further scrutiny is required for
systems with partner-checking, to bring out subtleties in the dynamics which the ESS
analysis might have overlooked.
The questions and discrepancies are perhaps the reflection of the non-fully ergodic nature
of  the  system,  due  to  the  limited  time  to  sytem  stability.  Can  this  in  turn  be  a
characteristic of social and economic systems which differentiates them from statistical
physical ones?
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